Transition, Tradition, and Nostalgia; Postsocialist Transformations in a Comparative Framework by Chris Hann
Coll. Antropol. 36 (2012) 4: 1119–1128
Original scientific paper
Transition, Tradition, and Nostalgia; Postsocialist
Transformations in a Comparative Framework
Chris Hann
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany
A B S T R A C T
The concepts of transition and tradition have not been the object of much original theoretical work in recent Anglo-
phone socio-cultural anthropology. The term transition has been applied loosely to the demise of socialist regimes in
Eastern Europe and their replacement by market economies and more pluralist forms of government. However, these ob-
jectives have proved elusive and most anthropologists therefore speak of open-ended »transformation processes« rather
than a linear shift to capitalist democracy. Use of the concept of tradition has been much influenced by the work of histo-
rians on the »invention of tradition«. This paper explores how societies, in particular elite groups, construct different
types of tradition in the wake of historical caesurae. Paying particular attention to the concept of nostalgia, it compares
perceptions of the past in Britain, where social change has been largely gradual, with those in empires and states which
experienced sharp political discontinuities in the twentieth century. To explain and understand nostalgia for socialism
in large sections of the population in many postsocialist states, it is necessary to investigate not only economic and social
mobility and related material factors but also factors pertaining to identity, especially collective identities.
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Introduction
I welcome the opportunity which this conference pro-
vides to discuss how the familiar terms transition and
tradition are used by specialists in very different fields of
anthropology from that in which I myself work. As a so-
cial anthropologist (or, in an older vocabulary, ethnolo-
gist) who specialized in Eastern Europe when the region
was still socialist, after 1990 I was inevitably drawn into
the multidisciplinary debates of »transitology«. However,
it is by no means straightforward to relate »the transi-
tion from communism« to transitions such as that in nu-
trition, addressed in other papers at this meeting. Since
the collapse of the Soviet bloc, many Eastern European
countries have experienced decline in significant sectors
of health care; for some groups mortality figures have in-
creased, at least temporarily. These patterns may be di-
rectly related to the transition that has concerned me in
recent decades as a social anthropologist, but it is not ob-
vious how they can be mapped on to the big transitions
studied by colleagues in epidemiology and biogenetics.
Let me begin by noting that all three words in my title
are common in contemporary English, with related
forms in many other European languages. However, each
can be used in a baffling variety of ways, even within the
same language and within the same or closely related ac-
ademic communities. It may be relatively easy for de-
mographers to speak of demographic transition because
there is a wide measure of consensus concerning the
studied phenomena and the criteria to be applied; but
even in this context I hear colleagues advising that it
may be preferable to speak of a plurality of »transitions«.
I suspect there is less agreement concerning criteria
when archaeologists discuss the transition from the (up-
per) Palaeolithic, or when historians investigate the
transition from feudalism to capitalism (to take two ex-
amples that have generated controversy in the past). The
concept of transition is especially problematic in social
anthropology, which has, for almost a century, been dom-
inated by ethnographic methods. If what counts as evi-
dence is determined primarily by fieldwork (»participant
observation«), it might be supposed that these research-
ers have no need at all of a concept which presupposes
diachrony. In practice, few of us limit ourselves to pure
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synchrony. In my own department at the Max Planck In-
stitute for Social Anthropology we have had a strong fo-
cus on postsocialist change, which entails the earlier ref-
erent: socialism. However, social and cultural
anthropologists have generally criticised the term »tran-
sition« in this context, which they interpret as implying a
specific known destination, that of capitalist market so-
ciety1. Instead, through their ethnographic studies they
have documented many examples of turbulent change,
sometimes »transformation«, while generally emphasiz-
ing fuzziness and the uncertainty of outcomes. They
have also drawn attention to continuities accompanying
visible manifestations of rupture. Socio-cultural anthro-
pologists have rarely documented a smooth transition to
capitalism. This has put us at odds with mainstream rep-
resentatives of larger disciplines such as economics and
political science who, even if they too are interested in
variation and »path dependency«, are more confident
than we tend to be in applying general models of sys-
temic change. More generally, anthropologists with dia-
chronic interests have the same gut suspicion of »transi-
tion« which many historians feel when they come to
periodize the past: transition is a weasel word, because
every historical epoch is necessarily transitional in one
sense or another.
Although we rarely argue for stasis or stagnation,
many of the facets of social life that socio-cultural an-
thropologists specialise in, such as kinship, change only
slowly when compared with the more dramatic caesurae
in politics and economics. This is where tradition kicks
in. Until recently, it was taken for granted that traditions
by definition evolve gradually, organically so to speak, as
the archetypal products of the Volksgeist. Many national
scholarly traditions (note the word again) in European
anthropology and ethnology have been infused with this
spirit. The origins of these academic disciplines can be
dated quite precisely to a certain »transition« in social
organization, in the direction of industrial economies
and nation-states. In recent decades, at least in Germany,
all this has changed once again. In the era of Europea-
nization, the old Volkskunde has given way to a compara-
tive europäische Ethnologie, a highly reflexive discipline
with an epistemology little different from that of Völker-
kunde, thus rendering the old distinction between these
two branches of socio-cultural anthropology anachronis-
tic. It seems to me that nowadays we sometimes fall into
the opposite trap and, following the impact of Hobsbawm
and Ranger2, assume that everything which people pres-
ent to us as tradition must be of recent invention, and
therefore inauthentic if not completely spurious. Cer-
tainly we need to be aware that something important
changes at the point when people start to become self-
conscious about practices which had previously evolved
with more spontaneity, before experts came along to cod-
ify costumes, songs and dances, and put them on the
stage to represent communities, regions, and even na-
tions. In Anatolia, for example, this transformation came
in the twentieth century when a secular nation-state
called Turkey replaced the Ottoman Empire. Its leaders
even invented a new Turkish-sounding word for tradi-
tion, gelenek, though most people continued to use the
Arabic-derived örp-adet, usually translated as custom3.
Perhaps local communities were never altogether free of
external interventions, but the impact of the outside
world has undoubtedly increased, and continues to do so
as the internet revolution follows those of radio and tele-
vision. Some aspects of habitual behaviour may nonethe-
less display resilience to change, or they may change as a
result of endogenous processes, »from within« rather
than from without. However, the commodification of cus-
tom and traditions confronts almost all Europeans nowa-
days, be it museum artefacts, the everyday symbols of
»banal nationalism«, or simply the products on the shel-
ves at the local supermarket.
Nostalgia, my third term in this paper, has tight links
to both tradition and transition. If we define nostalgia as
the experience of a yearning for the past, at the social
level it is presumably contingent on social change. We
might expect such yearning to be greater if the change
has been considerable, i.e. if some sort of radical transi-
tion has taken place. We might expect such nostalgia to
manifest itself in a heightened interest in traditions of all
kinds, to counter the sense of dislocation and rupture en-
tailed by the transition. In this way, nostalgia would con-
tribute to the formation of a conservative collective me-
mory. But what about societies in which it is hard to
specify precise moments of radical transition? Is nostalgia
less significant in countries where changes in the do-
mains of politics and economics are gradual and piece-
meal? What happens when a »modernist« regime explici-
tly combats nostalgia and seeks to orient the population
to a utopian future? If the futurist regime collapses, are
people liable to fall back into the patterns of a collective
memory preceding that regime? Or might four decades of
socialist rule be sufficient to make large sections of the
population nostalgic for an age in which nostalgia was
strictly forbidden?
Numerous socio-cultural anthropologists have stud-
ied the discursive politics surrounding the specific term
nostalgia (elements of irony, parody and commodification
are especially prominent in Eastern Germany), but that
is not the goal of this paper. I shall not elaborate a gen-
eral model of nostalgia, nor even a partial typology. In-
stead I approach the conference theme of transition and
tradition through comparisons limited to a few European
empires and states that have been intensively studied by
other social scientists. I begin by exploring the term nos-
talgia in a little more detail and contextualising the re-
cent inflation in its use. I then reflect on the nature of
collective nostalgia in Britain, an »old country« which
has experienced no major political convulsions in recent
centuries. In the third section I discuss two cases of im-
perial devolution, first the transition of Turkey, with one
dramatic caesura in the twentieth century, and then that
of Russia, with two. The fourth section extends the com-
parative analysis of postsocialist transformations and
puts forward a hypothesis to account for at least some of
the variation we find in individual and collective nostal-










gia for socialism more than two decades after its demise
in Eastern Europe. In this section and in the Conclusion
I argue that to explain postsocialist nostalgia we must, in
addition to documenting the material »winners« and
»losers« of the transition, also pay careful attention to a
range of factors pertaining to collective identities.
Nostalgia
Unlike the Latin derivations transition and tradition,
nostalgia is »pseudo-Greek, or nostalgically Greek«4. It
was coined in 1688 by a Swiss doctor to refer to the dis-
tress which followed from being cut off, even by a short
distance, from one’s home(land). The term’s semantic
trajectory need not concern us here. Some postmodern
theorizing harks back to the connotations of algos with
pain and suffering. Boym refers to »the disease of an af-
flicted imagination« and »hypochondria« of the heart,
while emphasizing that nostalgia was a »democratic«
condition experienced by increasing numbers of displa-
ced persons, rather than the individual melancholy of an
elite. However, the pleasurable, even romantic associa-
tions of nostos with home and past emotional belonging
seem stronger in contemporary everyday usage. Let us
begin at the level of the individual. As I understand the
term, nostalgia refers to basically positive emotions felt
when looking back on a period of one’s life which is over
and which, in most cases, cannot possibly be recaptured.
I take it for granted that in all societies there is consider-
able variation in the extent to which individuals experi-
ence such yearnings. Some of our friends and colleagues
seem to enjoy reminiscing from an early age, when we
might suppose that they really cannot have much to rem-
inisce about. Others are consistently future-oriented,
and long after their retirement they show no inclination
to mull over their achievements (or failures) in earlier
decades. We might cautiously suppose that the propen-
sity of individuals to reflect on the past, including the
possibility of nostalgic desire for it, will in all human soci-
eties increase over the life-course. However, nostalgia is
more than just a consciousness of ageing and sensations
of memento mori. Some external conditions affecting a
person’s life must be palpably different from what pre-
vails in the present: for example, migration has led her to
a new land, or social mobility has led him to new milieu,
and whether or not they have become materially better
off as a result of these transitions, those who have made
such transitions may be prone to pangs of nostalgia for
earlier ways of life.
Between the universal propensity and individual vari-
ation, anthropologists and historians have drawn atten-
tion to collective patterns in the ways societies conceptual-
ize time and order experiences within it. The connections
between individual and collective nostalgia may be tenu-
ous. It is hard to imagine that the era of the Gulag camps
could ever become a focus of collective nostalgia in Rus-
sia, but it is conceivable that some individual survivors
experienced lyrical moments that they somehow miss in
their later lives. In a further step, between the individual
and the primary macro-collectivity (which in recent ti-
mes has often been the nation) it will usually be impor-
tant to distinguish particular sub-groups as key agents in
the production of the collective memory. For example,
shamans or other ritual agents were probably crucial in
shaping the temporalities of the Palaeolithic through
myth. This role was taken over by literate priests and
clerks in the great agrarian empires, though mythical
narratives transmitted orally remained extremely impor-
tant. Nowadays we may hypothesize that history teach-
ers and school text books are important, but other modes
of transmission have by no means disappeared.
Both as a mass and an individual phenomenon, nos-
talgia – the practice itself and not just the word – seems
to be very much a phenomenon of post-agrarian society,
in which humans live longer and their mobility rates
(both geographical and social) have greatly increased.
The ethnologists who studied the »cold« societies of
hunter-gatherers and tribal horticulturalists did not re-
port significant levels of nostalgia or any similar tempo-
rality (although they themselves might express lyrical
nostalgia for the disappearing »savage« worlds they doc-
umented; see Lévi-Strauss 19555). Where the external
conditions were basically unchanging, the precondition
for nostalgia was missing: the berries or yams of one’s
childhood do not taste much different from the berries
and yams of today. Quite a lot of work on egalitarian
hunter-gatherer societies has indicated an emphatic pre-
sentism, consistent with an absence of storage technolo-
gies and investment possibilities. Even where investment
becomes important in the economy, basic experiences of
time in agrarian society are more likely to be cyclical, at
least for most of the population. These perceptions are
supplemented by cosmologies, some of which hold that
the past was due to recur anyway, while some offer the
promise of future salvation in another world.
By contrast, the »hot« societies of the industrial era
are radically different. When time is conceived as linear,
following the scientific revolution and the rise of factory
work (no longer dependent on the seasons), the scope for
nostalgia increases dramatically4. Nostalgia is therefore
a pendant of our general paradigm of modernity, strongly
associated with the growth of large cities. Because it is a
sentimental disposition, it is better captured by creative
writers or Cultural Studies scholars than by number-
-crunching social scientists. It enters a new stage with
the decline of Fordist production systems and their asso-
ciated »grand narratives«. This new stage is marked by
the consolidation of neoliberal consumerism and the her-
itage industries. Svetlana Boym, a Professor of Compara-
tive Literature, is more concerned more with aesthetics
than with the social sciences, let alone medicine. Her
conception of »restorative« nostalgia implies that an un-
welcome transition has occurred, and that the damage it
caused must be made good or cured. The term has be-
come ubiquitous, often introduced in the same breath as
»modernity« or »late capitalism« or »globalization«, with
references to scholars such as Arjun Appadurai, Jean
Baudrillard or Walter Benjamin. For example, for cul-










tural anthropologist Kathleen Stewart6 nostalgia was a
generic cultural practice, central to the Zeitgeist even be-
fore the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
However, there is no doubting that the fall of the
Berlin Wall unleashed further penchants for nostalgia,
previously rigorously suppressed in that particular vari-
ant of industrial modernity. This is one strong source of
inspiration for Svetlana Boym herself, who is not afraid
to broach the political dimensions of »post-communist
memory« in Russia and Eastern Europe. As the transi-
tion from one-party rule and planned economies failed to
bring the expected »blooming landscapes« (as promised
to East Germans by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in
1990), there has been an outpouring of academic works
and journalistic commentaries on postsocialist nostalgia.
In Germany, Nostalgie for socialism tends to be an as-
criptive term applied by West Germans pejoratively to
those former citizens of the German Democratic Repub-
lic who view some features of their old society in a posi-
tive light. The prominence of the term in the public
sphere, e.g. in the naming of retro bars or the marketing
of popular culture, has made it more difficult to assess
what people really think and share in more intimate
spheres. This is one instance of a more general problem
concerning the relationship between personal memories
and the efforts of other bodies, usually the state, to shape
a collective memory following a radical transition. The
editors of a recent collection suggest that »post-commu-
nist nostalgia« does not deserve its bad press7. This term
is a crude misnomer, argues Zsuzsa Gille8, because in
practice people do not generalise about the entirety of
their experiences before the transition. Rather, they look
back selectively and, when certain elements are posi-
tively evaluated, cultivate nostalgia as a form of social
critique in circumstances in which political channels to
express their discontent do not work effectively. Accord-
ing to Gille, »the very existence of nostalgia symbolizes
the evasion of talking about the past in the public sphere
and in political terms«. I shall return to the complexity of
postsocialist nostalgia below. First I want to broaden the
framework by considering some contrasting cases.
Britain: No Institutional Watersheds
since 1688
I have never conducted research in the country in
which I was born, grew up, studied and worked for most
of my life. Moving to Germany some fifteen years ago has
intensified my perception of the remarkable historical
continuities of my own Heimatland. I confess that I do
occasionally experience light forms of nostalgia for the
country that I continue to visit regularly, but in this sec-
tion I shall address the phenomenon at the collective
level. Even without having personal roots to distort the
picture, it is tempting to »naturalise« modern British
history, in other words to assume that what the academic
experts call social or collective memory, which elsewhere
we know to be soft and almost infinitely malleable, coin-
cides in this case with something hard and objective
called History. The danger to which we were alerted by
George Orwell, that most English of writers, of the past
being rewritten to suit the needs of the present, may be a
reality in most countries of the world, but Arthur
Bryant’s »Protestant island« has been happily immune
to major convulsions since the seventeenth century. We
might therefore imagine that in the case of Britain the
complex links between the subjective memories of per-
sons and the unfolding narrative of the nation are un-
usually free of external manipulation.
Closer inspection undermines the image of a charmed
island. Social memory turns out to be just as rich and dif-
ferentiated in gradualist Britain as in those cases where
new governments have repudiated their predecessors
and, following the transition, set about instilling their
own visions of the past on more or less truculent popula-
tions. It is possible even in Britain to identify turning
points and hence transitions. In the twentieth century,
two world wars had a massive impact on the victorious
powers, and not only on the losers. If I were Irish, I might
feel that the history of my country began afresh less than
a hundred years ago. Of course, the northern part of that
island has continued to suffer traumatic violence. But in
other parts of the Celtic fringe the violence subsided in
the very distant past. A path of liberal democratization
has been followed more or less consistently in all parts of
the main island for some two centuries. This change has
been painfully slow: the social class background of the
leaders of the present coalition government in London is
the best evidence for the enduring conservatism and so-
lidity of British society.
What does this imply for memory and nostalgia? Radi-
cals will dispute any suggestion that the processes of so-
cial memory are »natural«. They are likely to point to the
systematic instrumentalization of symbols, notably the
symbols of royalty. The monarchy has moved closer to
the people in the age of what Tom Nairn9 calls »Windsor-
dom«, but it continues to sustain domination: what other
conclusion can be drawn from the fact that so many sub-
jects report having dreams about the Queen stopping by
for a cup of tea? The mass media clearly have the power
to shape people’s memories of the years through which
they lived, be it the hardship of the war or the emanci-
patory music and fashions of the 1960s. Through cos-
tume dramas such as Pride and Prejudice as well as
blockbuster documentaries such as Niall Ferguson’s por-
trayal of Empire, television also has a massive impact on
perceptions of the more distant past. The tone is basi-
cally celebratory. As early as 1985, Patrick Wright10 drew
attention to the impact of the neo-conservative policies of
the Thatcher governments on our constructions and
commemorations of the past. These tendencies surely
have deeper roots, but processes of »heritagization« seem
to have intensified since the 1980s, such that the Na-
tional Trust itself now looks quaintly old-fashioned.
Nostalgia has flourished in connection with tourism,
a major sector of the economy. Where I come from in
South Wales, visitors can journey down the coal shaft of
»Big Pit« and gain insight into the brutal working condi-










tions of close-knit mining communities. Until recently,
many of the tour guides at Blaenavon were former min-
ers, but that authenticity has now been lost. Unemploy-
ment rates are very high throughout what used to be an
industrial region, with predictable consequences in terms
of child poverty and other indicators of social distress.
Yet emotions of nostalgia are cultivated at such heritage
sites, even where capitalist exploitation and class conflict
are recurring themes in the official narratives. The re-
cent commemoration of the life and work of Charles
Dickens (born in 1812) is further testimony to Britain’s
remarkable capacity to sanitize its history. Postmoder-
nist marketing techniques and global tourism work to
consolidate Whig narratives of history. Membership of a
European Community (Union) and the opening of labour
markets have played their part in promoting the search
for what is peculiarly British, or English. These trends
are reinforced by an array of institutions, from the school
history curriculum to citizenship tests, and by events
such as royal weddings and the opening ceremony of the
Olympic Games.
However, Patrick Wright was careful not to present
the British as the dupes of a dominant ideology. Socio-
-cultural anthropologists are expected to dig deeper into
subjectivities and processes glossed nowadays in terms of
agency, including socialization. Much of this knowledge
transmission takes place informally, among friends and
inside families. Some informal communication takes pla-
ce inside formal state institutions. I can still recall my
school geography teacher (Mr Cook) pointing to a new
wall map of Africa in the mid-1960s, with its multi-col-
oured independent states, but telling us in the same
breath with evident pride that until very recently the col-
our pink had prevailed in a continuous thick stripe be-
tween Cairo and Cape Town. Many of his pupils collected
postage stamps and knew this much about the British
Empire already. By this time the winds of change had
blown almost all of the colonies away, but the Beatles,
»swinging London« and winning the World Cup were
smoothing the transition to a new British society. Today
the 1960s, in turn, have long been mythologised. The
combination of the Olympics, 200 years of Dickens, 60
for the sovereign’s jubilee and 50 since the Rolling Sto-
nes played their first gig is ensuring that 2012 is a
bumper year for a British speciality, the effortless com-
modification and internalization of a permanent nostal-
gia encompassing our entire social lives, empowering or
disabling depending on one’s point of view, but in any
case branding the British of today in their old country.
Empires which Crashed
Other states which entered the twentieth century as
major imperial powers had very different experiences
from that of the British. One instructive contrast is the
violent emergence of the Turkish Republic from the Ot-
toman Empire, which had been in gradual decline for
centuries and finally collapsed in the wake of the First
World War. With the establishment of the Republic in
1922, the army officer Mustafa Kemal (who later adopted
the name Atatürk) set out to expunge as much as he
could of the old empire and its society. He moved the cap-
ital, abolished the Caliphate and instituted strict control
over religion by organs of the secular state. He rewrote
history to suit the ideological needs of the new national-
ism, and made the rupture even more complete by re-
forming the language and writing it in a new script.
Many of those literate in the old script never mastered
the new one. We may suppose high levels of nostalgia in
such groups, though such sentiments had to be confined
to the private sphere. However, overall literacy increased
dramatically in the following generations, as Anatolian
rural society was modernized and industrialized. Health-
care also improved. We may suppose that few of these vil-
lagers were nostalgic for the high child mortality rates of
the past.
This case, then, exemplifies rupture. However, some
of the social anthropological contributions have tended
to detect continuities over an extended process of transi-
tion. Paul Stirling, who went to Anatolia as a student of
Evans-Pritchard in 1949, found that the dramatic chan-
ges legislated by Atatürk in his new capital city were only
just beginning to transform life and customs in the vil-
lages in the 1950s11. Later ethnographers emphasized
the resilience of traditional political hierarchies12 and of
religious practices13. Stirling himself went back to Tur-
key again and again, revisiting the village of his original
fieldwork and following its families as labour migrants to
the major cities of Turkey and also to Germany. He em-
phasized the enormity of the changes which took place in
these decades, eventually describing them as a »cogni-
tive« transformation, since the amount and diversity of
the information processed by each individual were so dif-
ferent from what had characterised Anatolian villagers
in the past14. Paul Stirling assessed this transition posi-
tively, but others have taken a less sanguine view, point-
ing out that it is possible to retain and reproduce much of
the mentality of the village when living in the Cologne,
Kreuzberg or »parallel societies« elsewhere in Germany.
These are complex issues: it would be facile to attribute
the rise of fundamentalism and honour killings among
Turks and Kurds in contemporary Germany to nostalgia
for the purity of rural Anatolia15.
Atatürk’s state proved fragile and between 1960 and
1980 its core institutions could only be protected by a se-
ries of military interventions. Since 1980, however, a
gradualist reform process has seen the rise of a moderate
Islamism, increasingly infused with Turkish nationa-
lism16. This has opened new spaces for nostalgia, in par-
ticular for the Ottoman institutions swept away so abrup-
tly in the 1920s. For example, some members of the Is-
tanbul intelligentsia have rediscovered the cosmopolitan
heritage of their city, which they may or may not theorize
in terms of Western liberal multiculturalism. Although
they are secular or Muslim, they make pilgrimages to Or-
thodox Christian sites such as the monastery of St.
George on Princes Island, partly as a way of differentiat-
ing themselves from the mass of new immigrants from










Anatolia, disqualified from partaking in the imperial tra-
ditions of the metropolis17.
However, the rise to power of the moderate Islamists
has also brought about another, quite different form of
nostalgia. Nostalgia for »the modern«18 refers to the
sense of loss now experienced by those large sections of
the population who came, in the course of some three
generations, to valorise the secular republic, and who
now feel threatened as its key institutions are increas-
ingly called into question by the forces of Islamism and
global neoliberalism. The cultural anthropologist Esra
Özyürek documents how the old elites have begun com-
memorating their golden age in the 1930s. They collect
memorabilia of Atatürk privately, in the intimacy of their
homes, because this is where the legitimacy of power is
now based, rather than in the strong state tradition
which the Kemalists took over from the Ottomans. It is
hard to predict how the ensuing tensions will play out.
Perhaps the best one can hope for is that Turkey will con-
tinue its gradualist path, such that its citizens will be
able to indulge in both forms of nostalgia, for Atatürk
and for the great Sultans, and eventually somehow incor-
porate them into a single encompassing collective narra-
tive analogous to that of Britain. With the centenary of
the founding of Atatürk’s republic only a decade away, a
synthesis is urgently needed.
The end of the First World War also brought the de-
mise of other multicultural empires in Europe. Nowa-
days Habsburg nostalgia is as ripe for commercial exploi-
tation in the Galician centres of Cracow (Southern
Poland) and L’viv (Western Ukraine) as it has long been
inside the Ring at the old imperial capital. Nostalgia is
rather more problematic in the other, junior half of the
so-called dual monarchy. Even so, the architecture of cen-
tral Budapest betrays its development as an imperial
capital before the First World War. Some contemporary
Hungarians prefer to look back nostalgically to this era,
when they played second fiddle to Vienna under Habs-
burg rule, because their nation had more power and even
more dignity in that imperial formation than it had in
the »mutilated« states which followed it, first capitalist,
then socialist, and now capitalist again.
In Russia, the third great imperial power of Eastern
Europe at the start of the century, the Bolsheviks seized
power in 1917. Here, too, as under Atatürk, the initial vi-
sions were militantly futurist, but the Soviet commit-
ment to federalism was a major difference. Russian na-
tionalism was stifled not so much by the internationalist
rhetoric of Marxism as by the need to control and develop
a vast periphery. Compared to Kemalist Turkey, in the
USSR a much higher price in terms of human suffering
was paid for social transformation, above all during the
decade of collectivization and the purges. The Second
World War, known to Russians the Great Patriotic War,
brought a respite and even a certain rapprochement with
the principal surviving institution of the ancient regime,
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This did not last
long. We do not know much about the persistence of reli-
gion and an associated nostalgia in the cracks of the sys-
tem, inside families and »underground«, in the last de-
cades of Soviet socialism. The next significant rapproche-
ment with the ROC did not come until the age of peres-
troika, when the millennium of eastern Christianity in
1988 coincided with the beginning of the end of the
USSR. Throughout the Soviet decades the full force of
the state-controlled media and ritual cycle was deployed
in service of the state’s version of the past. Spaces were
eventually opened to commemorate the heroism of those
who built socialism and put the first man into space, as
well as those who defeated Hitler. But public signs of nos-
talgia for the pre-revolutionary era were problematic to
the end.
The changes which occurred in Russia in the 1990s
are broadly similar to those which have occurred in Tur-
key since 1983 – they were simply very much more
abrupt, both in politics and in economics. Divested of the
autonomous republics, Russians were now free to in-
dulge their own nationalism. They did so, as in Turkey,
in a tight alliance with the dominant religion. The ROC
revived its historic mission as the »third Rome« and
many ex-Communists from President Putin downwards
discovered their religious identities. Throughout the
land, politicians invited priests to join them for the cele-
bration of public rituals. Private businessmen invited
priests to bless their new enterprises and, in place of the
Soviet works outing, they now organized pilgrimages for
their workforce19. As in Turkey, the dominant religion is
seeping into public education, typically in the guise of
»Orthodox culture«20.
Just as some Turkish citizens are nostalgic for the
modernity of Kemalism, so Russia’s postsocialist trans-
formation has generated nostalgia for the modernity of
socialism, both for the early years when nostalgia was
precluded by militant future-oriented temporality and
for the later consolidation and relaxation which took
place under Leonid Brezhnev. The disruption caused by
the sudden shift to a market economy in the 1990s con-
demned millions to poverty and insecurity. Yet nostalgia
is not experienced only by the economic »losers« of the
transition. Tobias Köllner found that some of those who,
according to most objective criteria, should be classified
as »winners« of the transformation, nonetheless experi-
enced a sense of loss and a related nostalgia for the secu-
rity they had enjoyed in their former socialist places of
work. Conversely, some »losers« did not experience such
sentiments, e.g. if they had in the meantime found their
way to God or to a newly meaningful national identity.
By no means all victims of postsocialist transformation
in terms of what we might call their »class position« vote
consistently for the successor to the old Communist
Party.
A Comparative Approach to
Postsocialist Nostalgia
With these points from Russia in mind, throughout
contemporary Eastern Europe we can broach the dynam-
ics of multiple nostalgias, both for socialism and for what










preceded it. Todorova and Gille (2010) stress that nostal-
gia does not take the form of a totalizing package, since
individual subjects are in practice able to differentiate el-
ements they miss and value highly from those which they
detested then and still detest now. This is surely true.
And yet in my experience many do, at least in some situa-
tions, volunteer blanket opinions. They often phrase
them in terms of values.I For some, the value system of
socialism was incompatible with their view of what ma-
kes a healthy society. But for many others the core values
of socialism remain attractive, and they may appear even
more attractive from the very different vantage point
people have today, deep in neoliberal economic recession.
This does not mean that they have forgotten all the nega-
tive aspects, from queuing up to obtain groceries to the
application of political criteria in the allocation of jobs;
but even quite gross abuses can be retrospectively ratio-
nalized as imperfections in the implementation of attrac-
tive ideals, whereas today’s market society seems to
many to be altogether devoid of moral values.
Of course, each country (and sometimes separate re-
gions within countries) has its own peculiarities. Some
Germans may prefer to look back to their own days as a
glorious imperial power rather than to the Weimar Re-
public (monuments commemorating Bismarck remain
prominent in many parts of the country). As noted, some
Hungarians find it easier to experience nostalgia for the
Habsburg Empire than for either the inter-war state of
Admiral Horthy or the »goulash socialism« of János
Kádár. However, for the purposes of this paper I shall
concentrate on the transition from socialism to post-
socialism. Acknowledging that Economic (»class«) fac-
tors must play a major role in predisposing some people
to experience nostalgia for socialism, my argument is
that nostalgia is also shaped by what I term identity fac-
tors and changes in the polity. Specifically, where a social-
ist federal state was split up, it might be anticipated that
disillusionment can be assuaged through new modalities
of national manipulation, and hence nostalgia levels re-
duced. By contrast, where a socialist state disappeared
altogether, we can predict that nostalgia for socialism is
likely to be high.
The Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) is the
only case we have of a socialist state which disappeared.
According to the rhetoric of reunification (Wiederve-
reinigung), there never was more than one German
Vaterland. The restoration of congruence between politi-
cal and cultural boundaries should therefore have been
welcomed by all Germans, in just the same way as in the
cases of the Slovaks, Slovenes and the others. However,
the »flowering landscapes« did not materialise. East Ger-
man industry was annihilated by the strong capitalism of
the West, resulting in high levels of unemployment and
the large-scale exodus of skilled workers to the West. In
the public sector, including academic and scientific fields,
most senior staff were purged to make way for West Ger-
mans. It was sufficient to have been a member of the old
Communist Party (usually a precondition for high office
under the ancien régime) to be disqualified for office un-
der the new regime. All this distinguished the transfor-
mation of East Germany from that of every other state in
the region. The emergence of the category »Ossi« and its
deployment by both eastern and western Germans led
serious academic analysts to suggest that the former now
qualified as an ethnic group, according to the standard
criteria used in defining such a group21,22. Whereas in
Russia and elsewhere the collapse of socialism trans-
formed titular minority nationalities into new nation-
-states, in this case an overwhelming majority (the Sorbs
were the only recognized minority in the DDR) became a
stigmatized minority in the new amalgam.
Some aspects of the resulting (N)ostalgie for the days
when eastern German matters were determined by east-
ern Germans, as well as symbols such as the Trabant and
the Ampelmännchen, have become well known interna-
tionally through the success of films such as Goodbye Le-
nin and Sonnenallée.II Thanks to The Life of Others and
a phenomenal output of STASI-related literature, every-
one is also aware of the repugnant practices that made
the DDR one of the most repressive of all socialist re-
gimes. (It was, for example, for many years afraid to al-
low its citizens freedom of travel eastwards to »unreli-
able« Poland, let alone westwards.) We need to bear in
mind that virtually all these representations of the for-
mer East, the playful as well as the diabolical, have been
controlled by West Germans, as Paul Cooke23 has neatly
elaborated with the help of postcolonial theory. The tri-
vialization of socialism through the selling of kitsch sou-
venirs to tourists at Checkpoint Charlie reflects the uni-
fied market society which has replaced the Wall. It is not
surprising that many young people in the East react neg-
atively to the hype of Ostalgie and emphasize what they
have in common with all Germans of their generation.
They reject the designations Ossi and Wessi24. Yet we
know from anthropological investigations undertaken af-
ter the Wende that many older East Germans do look
back with nostalgia for the lost sociality of their briga-
des25. In the harsh climate of the Hartz Vier labour mar-
ket regulations, many yearn for the range of social sup-
ports formerly provided by their enterprises26,27. Super-
markets in the east still find it profitable to reserve
shelves for Ostprodukte, usually brands dating to the so-
cialist era, which have acquired the aura of regional tra-
dition and which people prefer to the new international
competitors.
Nostalgia may help individuals to cope, either alone
or in groups of people who share life histories. In Eastern
Germany it can hardly be therapeutic or »curative« (in
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the terminology of Svetlana Boym) because in the public
sphere there is no healing process to speak of. East Ger-
mans voted for unification but were then disadvantaged
by its economic and social consequences. For those who
lost their jobs, the decline in material conditions could be
a decline in absolute terms. Recent figures indicate that
the economic gap between east and west is growing, two
decades after unification; both wages and pensions in the
east remain significantly below western levels. For oth-
ers, whether or not they use the Ossi-Wessi dichotomy, it
is more accurate to speak of a new sense of relative depri-
vation vis-à-vis West Germans. A combination of material
and immaterial factors leads some East Germans to cul-
tivate an ambivalent nostalgia, which is more likely to
manifest itself in the consumption of Ostprodukte than
in support for hardline factions within the former com-
munist party. As Daphne Berdahl (2010) recognized very
early, this (N)ostalgie seldom reflected a sincere wish to
restore the encompassing world of »actually existing so-
cialism«. It was rather an expression of resentment at
the extent to which not only jobs but also vast swathes of
everyday popular culture (including sport, of which citi-
zens of the German Democratic Republic had previously
had good reason to be proud) were now dominated by
West Germans. People reacted negatively to denigration
in the mass media, whereOstwas equated with a mental-
ity of shabby complaining and state dependence, as well
as the material culture of two-stroke engines and Plat-
tenbau apartments. No wonder, then, that such devalua-
tion led millions to recall the positive elements in their
life-histories. Some of these elements only added fuel to
the deprecation of the Wessis. While Ossis recalled the
freedoms they enjoyed in certain privileged niches, such
as the Kleingarten (allotment), Wessis pontificated that
such niches were hardly a substitute for democracy and a
free civil society; and so theMauer in den Köpfen came to
outlive the material wall which divided Berlin for nearly
three decades.III
Of course, Ossis also pointed to female participation
in the labour force and the availability of excellent child-
care facilities as positive features of their lost society.
Here they touched a sensitive theme for many Wessis,
who had to concede that in some fields at least the citi-
zens of the former DDR had good reason to mourn the
passing of a system that, by the usual Western criteria,
was more modern than the one imposed in its place.
Some have welcomed the revival of religion in the public
sphere and church schools, just like the supporters of the
Justice and Development Party in Turkey. But others are
nostalgic for the decades of a modernity that was unam-
biguously secular and deplore the waste of public money
in rebuilding churches destroyed under socialism.
The opposite case to that of the disappearance of the
German Democratic Republic is the socialist federal sta-
te which gave rise to multiple independent sovereign
states. Here I can draw neither on fieldwork nor on years
of residence to support my analysis; nor am I familiar
with very much of the specialist literature. But it seems a
priori plausible to suggest that even those not strongly
committed to the new station-state for purely patriotic
reasons will be obliged to focus energies on reconstruct-
ing the political landscape and securing their place with-
in it. Such people will be too busy to wallow in nostalgia
for the ancien régime. My impression is that some of the
factors I noted above for Russia are also relevant to the
cases of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Widespread dis-
illusionment with the socio-economic consequences of
the collapse of the socialist order is at least in some mea-
sure mitigated by national independence. However, it
also needs to be born in mind that some citizens of the to-
day’s Russian Federation may feel pangs of nostalgia for
the socialist imperial formation they have lost. Similar
sentiments may not be unknown in Serbia, clearly the
most powerful of the Yugoslav republics albeit not the
most prosperous32.
Of course the three cases differ greatly. Czechoslova-
kia’s »velvet divorce« could hardly contrast more strong-
ly with the extreme violence and large-scale loss of life
experienced in the Western Balkans. This violence has
contributed to the phenomenon of »Yugo-nostalgia«. A
sense of Yugoslav identity appears to have been gaining
ground in the later decades of socialism, cemented espe-
cially among the young by unified sports teams and com-
mon experiences in the army33. The legacy of the violence
of the 1990s is not obvious: for some, an interpretation in
terms of sacrifice for the national cause, possibly more
common among the men who wielded the weapons, may
tend to diminish nostalgia for the earlier constraints of
federation. For others, the same violence may engender
nostalgia for the peace and relative security which pre-
vailed previously. Women in particular may look back
more positively on an era in which childcare provision
and their prospects of employment were better than the
options available today. In short, we can expect Yugo-nos-
talgia to vary according to gender as well as age and occu-
pational group. Due to the peculiarities of self-manage-
ment and much greater regional heterogeneity, accen-
tuated from 1974 onwards by constitutional changes,
non-aligned Yugoslavia became ever less like the more
balanced federalism administered from Prague. Yugosla-
via did not collectivize agriculture, a point of fundamen-
tal significance for millions. Unlike Poland, which also
opted to avoid the modernization of its agricultural sec-
tor, Yugoslavia allowed millions of its citizens free access
to the labour markets of West Germany and other west-
ern countries. In spite of these and many other differ-
ences, this variant of federalist socialism still had much
in common with the single-party régimes of neighbour-
ing states and therefore has to be integrated into the
comparative framework.
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Like the term »revolution«, which I have examined
recently in another context34, the term »transition« has
been called upon for a great variety of tasks in different
academic traditions. I do not dispute its usefulness to de-
mographers or epidemiologists, if they can agree on rig-
orous specifications. However, in large social science lit-
eratures, such as those on »the transition to market
economy« or »democracy transition«, transition seems to
be a weasel word, in urgent need of more precision. To
the extent that political events impose their visible, self-
-evident ruptures, persons and groups may develop emo-
tions and opinions towards what was left behind. In the
case of socialism, this means an entire social order: the
political changes reached promptly and profoundly to
penetrate the domestic sphere, e.g. through cuts in child
care provision. High levels of nostalgia are to be expected
at various levels: the individual, families, social groups of
many kinds, and even entire nations. But is nostalgia it-
self another weasel word, which confuses more than it il-
luminates?
My basic assumption is that collectivities, like individ-
uals, have histories. To impose order on their continuous
movement through time, some form of periodization is
necessary, just as individuals create order when con-
structing their biographies. In the history of societies,
neither stagnation nor revolutionary transformation is
ever a realistic descriptor (though some academic histori-
ans have fantasised about the former, and the latter is
projected by utopian visionaries of many kinds). These
collective entities are defined by memories, which are so-
cially formed. Nostalgia needs to be investigated in this
broad context. The interdisciplinary literature suggests
that we need to pay attention to very general processes of
modernization: yearning for a halcyon past is likely to in-
tensify when social change is rapid, when utopias are fre-
quently reformulated and futures become increasingly
uncertain. People who feel nostalgia may or may not re-
allywish to retrieve what they present as idyll. Generally
this is impossible, because the transition to something
new is irreversible. It follows that their sentiments must
be understood as commentary on the present, and even
as a form of resistance to the prevailing order, with impli-
cations for future alternatives. In the case of the transi-
tion from socialism, we need to be alert to high levels of
commercial and political manipulation of the discourse of
nostalgia, mainly by Western elites but with the signifi-
cant connivance of local elites who have their own good
reasons for despising the »backwardness« of their coun-
trymen.
Nostalgia may be more conspicuous where social
change has been »punctuated« by major political up-
heaval, but similar past-oriented emotions occur and are
liable to manipulation in countries where change is more
gradualist. I began this paper by comparing the case of
Britain’s imperial decline with cases of sudden, not to say
cataclysmic change in Turkey and Russia. Attempting to
eliminate nostalgia through utopian futurism and re-
pression of alternative narratives of the past may be
counterproductive: they may result in the persistence
over generations of strong, even virulent strains of nos-
talgia where state power fails to penetrate, in the private
sphere. This does not mean that subjectively experienced
nostalgia in the more liberal society is formed naturally,
in some ideal sphere free of constraint.
It is further instructive to make comparisons in a sec-
ond phase, long after the original caesura of political
transition. Turkey exemplifies a gradualist counterrevo-
lution, in comparison with the more radical rupture that
brought about the end of the Soviet Union. Neither of
these cases was framed as a restoration. The restorations
and revolutions of seventeenth century England also
need careful scrutiny: rhetorical claims may have far-
-reaching effects, but the fit with material, institutional
change is never straightforward.
In the final section, I probed different experiences of
postsocialist nostalgia in Eastern Europe. Some coun-
tries have aspired to the ideals of restoration, e.g. Hun-
gary, where the official narratives emphasize the crown
of King (Saint) Stephen and a glorious past, while in my
own experiences there is a good deal of nostalgia in many
sections of the population for the often undignified but
pragmatic and generally rather successful compromises
of »market socialism«. I advanced a simple framework to
suggest how, in accounting for patterns of nostalgia,
economistic models of winners and losers rooted in
»class« factors need to be modified by changes in the pol-
ity and factors pertaining to ethnicity and nation, or in
the most general formulation »identity«. Some loser or
victim groups which might look rather similar on paper
in East Germany and, say, the Czech Republic, may turn
out to diverge considerably when it comes to actual pat-
terns of yearning for (particular elements of) the socialist
past. The case of former Yugoslavia is complicated by vio-
lence and warfare, which were strongly coloured (but
perhaps not ultimately determined) by pre-existing iden-
tity-based conflicts. Generalising, one can suggest that
the disposition to nostalgia for (some elements of) social-
ism is not reducible to either the economic performance,
or the political nastiness of the particular regime, or the
extent of manipulation of discourse by the new hege-
monic power. Identity factors also matter. Nor is this a
simple matter of ethnic or national identity. In the case of
East Germany, the derogatory term Ossi emerged as a
novel regional identity, at least at the level of discourse,
following the elimination of the state, coupled with a de-
terioration of material conditions, sometimes in absolute
as well as relative terms. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe,
the fragmentation of federal states into national entities
probably tended to diminish the propensity to nostalgia
in many (not necessarily all) social groups, although the
incidence of violence and economic dislocation must also
be taken into account.










R E F E R E N C E S
1. VERDERY K, What was socialism, and what comes next? (Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, 1996). — 2. HOBSBAWME, RANGER T
(Eds) The invention of tradition. (Cambridge University Press, Cambri-
dge, 1983). — 3. HANN C, Tradition, sozialer Wandel, Evolution: Defizite
in der sozialanthropologischen Tradition. In: SIEGENTHALER H (Ed)
Rationalität im Prozess kultureller Evolution. Rationalitätsunterstellun-
gen als eine Bedingung der Möglichkeit substantieller Rationalität des
Handelns (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005). — 4. BOYM S, The future of
nostalgia (Basic Books, New York, 2001). — 5. LÉVI-STRAUSS C, Tristes
tropiques (Plon, Paris, 1955). — 6. STEWART K, Cultural Anthropology,
3 (1988) 227. DOI: 10.1525/can.1988.3.3.02a00010 — 7. TODOROVA M,
GILLE Z (Eds) Post-communist nostalgia (Berghahn, New York, 2010).
— 8. GILLE Z, Postscript. In: TODOROVA M, GILLE Z (Eds) Post-com-
munist nostalgia (New York, Berghahn, 2010). — 9. NAIRN T, The en-
chanted glass: Britain and its monarchy (Radius, London, 1988). — 10.
WRIGHT P, On living in an old country: The national past in contempo-
rary Britain (Verso, London, 1985). — 11. STIRLING P, Turkish village
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1965). — 12. MEEKERM, A nation of
empire. The Ottoman legacy of Turkish modernity (University of Califor-
nia Press, Berkeley CA, 2002). DOI: 10.1525/california/9780520225268.
001.0001 — 13. TAPPER N, TAPPER R, 'Thank God we’re secular!' As-
pects of fundamentalism in a Turkish town. In: CAPLAN L (Ed) Studies
in religious fundamentalism (University of New York Press, Albany NY,
1987). — 14. STIRLING P, Introduction: Growth and changes: Speed,
scale, complexity. In: STIRLING P (Ed) Culture and economy: Changes
in Turkish villages (Eothen, Huntingdon, 1993). — 15. SCHIFFAUER W,
Die Gewalt der Ehre: Erklärungen zu einem deutsch-türkischen Sexual-
konflikt (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main, 1995). — 16. WHITE JB, Muslim
nationalism and the new Turks (Princeton University Press, Princeton
NJ, 2012). — 17. COUROUCLI M, Empire Dust: The web of relations in
Saint George’s Festival on Princes Island in Istanbul. In: HANN C, HER-
MANN G (Eds) Eastern Christians in anthropological perspective (Uni-
versity of California Press, Berkeley CA, 2010). DOI: 10.1525/california/
9780520260559.001.0001 — 18. ÖZYÜREK E, Nostalgia for the modern:
State secularism and everyday politics in Turkey (Duke University Press,
Durham, 2006). — 19. KÖLLNER T, Practising without belonging: En-
trepreneurship, morality and religion in contemporary Russia. PhD The-
sis. (University of Leipzig, Leipzig, 2011). — 20. £ADYKOWSKA A, Or-
thodox Atheist’: Education, religion and morality in contemporary
Russia. PhD Thesis. (Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg, in pre-
paration). — 21. HOWARD M, German Politics and Society, 13 (1995) 49.
— 22. BIERSCHENK T, Für einen Ethnologen eine klare Sache: natürlich
sind Ossis eine Ethnie. Press Release. Johannes Gutenberg-Universität.
Mainz, 21. April 2010). — 23. COOKE P, Representing East Germany
since unification (Berg, Oxford, 2005). — 24. HANN M, Collective mem-
ory and history within a context of social transition in East Germany. BA
Dissertation. (Department of Anthropology, University of London, Lon-
don, 2008). — 25. MÜLLER B, Disenchantment with market economics.
East Germans and western capitalism (Berghahn, New York, 2007). —
26. THELEN T, The loss of trust: Changing social relations in the work-
place in Eastern Germany. Working Paper No. 78. (Max Planck Institute
for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, 2006). Available from: URL: http://
www.eth.mpg.de/cms/en/publications/working_papers — 27. THELEN T,
Experiences of devaluation: Work, gender and identity in Eastern Ger-
many. Working Paper No. 85. (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropol-
ogy, Halle/Saale, 2006). Available from: URL: http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/
en/publications/working_papers — 28. BERDAHL D, On the social life of
postsocialism: Memory, consumption, Germany (Ed Matti Bunzl) (Indi-
ana University Press, Bloomington 2010) DOI: 10.1093/gerhis/ghq118. —
29. BOYER D, From algos to autonomos. Nostalgic Eastern Europe as
postimperial mania. In: TODOROVA M, GILLE Z (Eds) Post-communist
nostalgia (Berghahn, New York, 2010). — 30. DALE G, Debatte. Journal
of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 14 (2006) 155. DOI: 10.
1080/09651560701483253. — 31. GALLINAT A, History and Anthropol-
ogy, 20 (2009) 183. DOI: 10.1080/02757200902885950. — 32. TODORO-
VA M, Introduction: From utopia to propaganda and back. In: TODORO-
VA, M, GILLE Z (Eds) Post-communist nostalgia (Berghahn, New York,
2010). — 33. PETROVI] T, Nostalgia for the JNA? Remembering the
army in the former Yugoslavia. In: TODOROVA M, GILLE Z (Eds) Post-
-Communist Nostalgia. (Berghahn, New York, 2010). — 34. HANN C, Big
revolutions, two small disciplines, and socialism. In: SHANKLAND D
(Ed) Anthropology and Archaeology (Berg, Oxford, 2012).
C. Hann
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, PO Box 110351, 06017 Halle/S, Germany
e-mail: hann@eth.mpg.de
TRANZICIJA, TRADICIJA I NOSTALGIJA; POSTSOCIJALISTI^KE TRANSFORMACIJE
U POREDBENOM OKVIRU
S A @ E T A K
Koncepti tranzicije i tradicije nisu bili ~esta tema originalnih teoretskih radova u recentnoj anglofonoj sociokul-
turnoj antropologiji. Pojam tranzicije primjenjivao se uglavnom vrlo neodre|eno i odnosio prvenstveno na socijalisti~ke
re`ime isto~ne Europe i njihovu zamjenu tr`i{nim ekonomijama i pluralisti~kim oblicima vlasti. No pokazalo se da je
pojam tranzicije suvi{e kompleksan i varljiv pa ve}ina antropologa danas radije govori o „transformacijskim procesima«
nego o lineranom prijelazu na kapitalisti~ku demokraciju. Rad povjesni~ara na „izmi{ljanju tradicije« imao je velik
utjecaj na kori{tenje pojma tranzicija. Ovaj rad istra`uje kako dru{tva, a posebno njezini elitni slojevi, stvaraju razne
tipove tranzicija. Obra~aju}i posebnu pa`nju konceptu nostalgije, rad uspore|uje percepciju povijesti u Velikoj Britaniji,
gdje su se dru{tvene promjene odvijale relativno postepeno, s onom u dr`avama koje su pro`ivjele velike politi~ke pre-
vrate u dvadesetom stolje}u. Kako bismo mogli {to bolje objasniti nostalgiju za socijalizmom koja postoji u velikom
dijelu mnogih postsocijalisti~kih dru{tava, potrebno je istra`iti ne samo ekonomsku i dru{tvenu mobilnost i srodne
materijalne faktore, ve} i faktore kao {to su identitet, osobno i kolektivno.
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